

































Populisme	 biasanya	muncul	 saat	 terdapat	 ketidakpuasan	 terhadap	 sistem,	 dan	menciptakan	 dua	 kelompok	 berbeda	
sebagai	bentuk	polarisasi,	“elit”	melawan	“rakyat.”	Kelompok	tersebut	merupakan	hasil	dari	daya	tarik	anti-elit.	Adapun	
pemimpin	 populis	 Indonesia	 juga	 menggunakan	 daya	 tarik	 tersebut	 untuk	 mencari	 dukungan	 masyarakat,	 namun	
demikian	hal	tersebut	harus	dilihat	sebagai	bagian	dari	bentuk	kepemimpinan	yang	pragmatis.	Artikel	ini	berpendapat	
bahwa	penggunaan	populisme	di	 Indonesia	 lebih	dilatarbelakangi	motivasi	pragmatis	daripada	alasan	 fundamental.	
Alasan	pragmatis	ini	dapat	dilihat	dari	pernyataan	yang	tidak	konsisten	dalam	kepemimpinan	yang	mana,	pada	saat	
awal,	 tampak	 mendukung	 gagasan	 populisme	 namun	 berbeda	 secara	 realita.	 Para	 pemimpin	 politik	 di	 Indonesia	
berusaha	untuk	mengupayakan	kemajuan	sekaligus	mencari	kompromi	dan	dukungan	dari	banyak	kalangan,	termasuk	
dari	mereka	yang	dianggap	sebagai	bagian	dari	elit.	 	Dengan	menggunakan	studi	dokumen	sekunder	dari	jurnal	dan	
artikel	 berita	 pada	 saat	 kampanye	 presiden	 terakhir	 antara	 Joko	 Widodo	 dan	 Prabowo	 pada	 tahun	 2019,	 dapat	
disimpulkan	bahwa	semua	ciri	strategi	populis	telah	digunakan	secara	pragmatis	oleh	kedua	tokoh	tersebut.	Strategi	











United	 States	 (U.S.)	 and	 the	 Philippines	
started	to	experience	populism	nowadays.	In	
the	 United	 States,	 for	 instance,	 President	
Donald	 Trump	 came	 to	 power	 with	 his	
political	campaign	of	white	American	society	
and	 a	 staunch	 anti-immigration	 position	
(Robinson,	 2018).	 Meanwhile,	 President	
Duterte	of	 the	Philippines	 identified	himself	
as	 a	 strong	 anti-drug	 leader	 and,	 allegedly,	
exploits	 gender	 in	 his	 political	 approach	
(Tanyag,	 2018).	 The	 rise	 of	 populism	 in	 the	
world	 is	 not	 only	 seen	 as	 an	 emergence	 of	
certain	 political	 figures,	 but	 also	 as	 a	 fight	
against	 inequality	 (Darmawan,	 2017).	
Populism	is	also	believed	to	have	happened	in	
Indonesia.	 Many	 political	 science	 scholars	
believe	that	the	rise	of	Joko	Widodo	or	more	
popularly	known	as	Jokowi,	as	the	Governor	
of	 Jakarta	 in	 2012	 and	 as	 the	 Indonesian	
President	in	2014	(Sianipar,	2015),	indicated	
to	 the	 rise	of	populism	 in	 Indonesia.	 Jokowi	
was	viewed	as	a	representative	of	the	people	
and	was	detached	from	Indonesia’s	oligarchy	
thus	 his	 public	 image	 demonstrated	
characteristics	 that	populist	 leaders	 identify	
with	(Beech,	2014).		
In	 supporting	 the	 claim	 of	 anti-elite,	
populist	leaders	tend	to	utilize	demagogy	by	
accusing	the	ruling	elite.	Indonesian	populist	
leader	 also	 applies	 the	 strategy	 to	 appeal	
large	 supports	 of	 citizens.	 In	 the	 words	 of	
Mietzner	 (2015:	 22-23),	 it	 is	 related	 to	 the	
rise	 of	 Prabowo	 with	 his	 populist	 textbook	
approach	 and	 Jokowi’s	 inclusiveness	 and	
politeness	 form	 of	 ‘technocratic	 populism’.	
However,	these	implementations	of	populism	
must	 be	 understood	 as	 part	 of	 pragmatist	
leadership.	The	populist	 leader	 in	 Indonesia	
uses	anti-elite	discourse	merely	as	a	political	
strategy	 to	 find	 larger	 support.	 This	 paper	
argues	 that	 the	 utilization	 of	 populism	 in	
Indonesia	 is	more	motivated	by	a	pragmatic	
reason	rather	than	a	fundamental	reason.	The	
fundamental	 reason	 here	 is	 related	 to	 the	
original	 background	 that	 forms	 anti-elite	
motive,	which	in	turn	will	be	fulfilled	in	future	
policy.	Meanwhile,	the	pragmatic	reason	is	a	
leader’s	 interest	 to	 be	 in	 power.	 This	
pragmatic	 reason	 can	 be	 seen	 through	
inconsistent	 statement	 in	 the	 leadership	
which,	 at	 first,	 supports	 populist	 claim	 but	
tends	 to	 be	 different	 in	 reality.	 Political	
leaders	 in	 Indonesia	 try	 to	 strive	 for	 a	
progress	as	well	as	to	seek	a	compromise	and	
a	 support	 from	 various	 groups,	 including	
those	 labeled	 as	 elite	 by	 the	 populists	
themselves.	This	paper	will	focus	on	the	case	
of	 Jokowi	 and	 Prabowo	 up	 to	 the	 2019	
presidential	 campaign,	 to	 see	 how	 the	
dynamics	 of	 Indonesia	 created	 a	 different	
phenomenon	in	populism.		
To	 elaborate	 on	 the	 above	 argument,	
this	paper	is	divided	as	follows.	It	starts	with	
a	 simple	 explanation	 of	 populism	 and	
pragmatist	leadership.	Second,	there	is	a	brief	
trajectory	of	Indonesia’s	path	to	what	we	see	
as	 ‘pragmatic	 populism’.	 It	 presents	 a	
phenomenon	 of	 how	 political	 leaders	 in	
Indonesia	 compromise	 and	 start	 using	
populism	 as	 an	 approach.	 Then,	 there	 is	 an	
analysis	 of	 populism	 in	 Indonesia.	 This	
section	focuses	on	how	Indonesia	presents	a	
unique	 and	 a	 different	 phenomenon	
compared	 to	 other	 countries.	 Last	 but	 not	
least,	there	is	a	conclusion	at	the	end	of	this	
paper.	 The	 paper	 aims	 to	 offer	 some	





of	 people’s	 dissatisfaction	 towards	 an	
unbalanced	 power	 relation.	 Concerning	
democracy;	 Canovan	 (1999)	 stated	 that	
populism	 tends	 to	 appear	 when	 there	 is	
domination	 inside	 the	 government	 and	
political	 parties	 by	 the	 elite	 and	 oligarchs.	
Populism,	therefore,	can	arise	from	the	failure	
to	recognize	the	voice	of	the	majority	(Crick,	
2005:	 630-632).	 However;	 populism	 hasn’t	
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been	 defined	 into	 one	 single	 explanation	
because	 political	 science	 scholars	 are	 still	
debating	over	what	populism	is.	Some	argue	
that	 populism	 is	 an	 “ideology”,	while	 others	
say	that	it	is	more	into	the	style	of	leadership	
or	political	 strategy	 (Jaffrelot,	2018).	One	of	
the	most	 popular	 definitions	 of	 populism	 is	
from	 Mudde	 (2004:	 543).	 He	 argues	 that	
populism	 is	 “an	 ideology	 that	 considers	
society	 to	 be	 ultimately	 separated	 into	 two	
homogeneous	 and	 antagonistic	 groups,	 “the	
pure	 people”	 versus	 “the	 corrupt	 elite”,	 and	
which	 argues	 that	 politics	 should	 be	 an	
expression	 of	 the	 volontégénérale	 (general	
will)	of	the	people.”	
On	 the	 other	 hand,	 according	 to	
Weyland	(2001:	14),	populism	is	defined	as	a	
“political	 strategy	 through	 which	 a	
personalistic	 leader	 seeks	 or	 exercises	
government	 power	 based	 on	 direct,	
unmediated	 and	uninstitutionalized	 support	
from	 large	 numbers	 of	 mostly	 unorganized	
followers.”	In	the	words	of	Pakulski	(2018:	4-
5),	 populist	 leaders	 share	 ideal	 common	
characteristics,	 which	 are:	 use	 anti-elite	
discourse,	 employ	 demagogy,	 claim	 to	 be	
authentic	 voices,	 try	 to	 blame	 the	 elite,	 and	
offer	 simplified	 remedies.	 However,	 recent	
development	 on	 populism	 has	 shown	 that	
contemporary	 populist	 leader	 tends	 to	 be	
different	 in	 practice	 (Pakulski,	 2018:	 7).	 In	
Indonesia,	 recent	 development	 has	 raised	
technocratic	 populism	 (Mietzner,	 2015),	
which	in	practice	tends	to	be	more	pragmatic	
as	 it	 offers	 a	 very	 different	 approach	
compared	 to	 classical	 populism.	 Here,	 this	
development	 will	 be	 seen	 as	 a	 pragmatist	
approach	 of	 populism	 in	 terms	 of	 political	
strategy	and	leadership.	This	paper	uses	the	
definition	 of	 a	 pragmatist	 leader,	 the	 leader	
who	 focuses	 on	 reaching	 his	 goals	 and	 also	
accommodates	different	 ideas	particularly	 if	
there	 is	 a	 pressing	 issue	 for	 him.	 In	 this	
regard,	the	ability	of	a	pragmatist	leader	is	to	
find,	 to	 maintain	 and	 to	 combine	 support	
from	 various	 backgrounds	 of	 groups.	 The	




Looking	 into	 the	 above	 definitions	 on	
populism,	it	can	be	concluded	that	populism	
as	 a	 political	 strategy	 and	 leadership	 is	
related	 to	 Resentment,	 Representation,	 and	
Relationship	as	 its	characteristics.	 It	 tries	 to	
condemn	 the	 elite,	 by	 establishing	 a	 direct	
relationship	with	the	people	 in	which	at	 the	
end	 could	 undermine	 democracy.	
Resentment	 is	 the	 situation	 in	 which	 the	
leader	 tends	 to	 condemn	 the	 elite	 as	 the	
source	 of	 the	 country’s	 problems.	 An	 ideal	
populist	 leader	 tries	 to	 frame	 the	 elite	with	
contempt	 and	 hatred	 while	 a	 pragmatic	
pluralist	tries	to	find	a	compromise	between	
the	 people’s	 will	 and	 the	 government	 or	
elite’s	 interest	 without	 targeting	 a	 specific	
group.	 In	 this	 regard,	 the	 goal	 of	 an	 ideal	
populist	 is	 to	revamp	the	political	system	of	
the	 country	by	 targeting	 a	 specific	 group	 as	
the	enemy	of	the	state.	The	pragmatist,	on	the	
other	 hand,	 acknowledges	 the	 need	 of	 the	
people	without	promising	a	radical	change	of	
the	system	and	not	targeting	a	specific	actor	




The	 second	 characteristic	 is	 related	 to	
representation	 or	 to	 whom	 the	 leader	 is	
associated	 with.	 Ideal	 populists	 identify	
themselves	 as	 a	 part	 of	 the	 people	 and	 to	
proclaim	the	interest	of	the	people,	especially	
to	those	who	are	excluded	and	marginalized	
by	 the	 elite.	 This	 type	 of	 populists	 is	 often	
seen	 to	 identify	 themselves	 as	 a	 true	
representative	 of	 the	 people,	 where	 they	
come	 from,	 and	 know	 what	 is	 best	 for	 the	
people.	 Therefore,	 they	 usually	 portray	
themselves	 as	 a	 part	 of	 the	 majority	 group	
(Aspinalll,	2015:	1-5;	Mietzner,	2015:	17-18).	
Meanwhile,	a	pragmatist	populist	tries	to	be	
in	 the	 middle,	 accommodating	 both	 “the	
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of	 the	 leader	 tends	 to	garner	 the	support	of	
people	 who	 can	 assist	 him	 in	 reaching	 his	
goals.	 As	 for	 a	 non-populist	 leader,	 he	
identifies	himself	as	a	part	of	the	elite.		
The	 last	 characteristic	 is	 about	 the	
relationship	 between	 the	 leader	 and	 the	




populism	 has	 been	 viewed	 as	 a	 threat	 to	
democracy	 because	 of	 the	 possibility	 to	
undermine	 checks	 and	 balances	 (Hamid,	
2014:	 89).	 On	 the	 other	 hand,	 a	 pragmatist	
populist	 combines	 both	 direct	
communication	 and	 communication	 using	
intermediaries.	The	last	type	of	populist	 is	a	
non-populist	 leader,	 who	 tends	 to	 use	
intermediaries	 when	 communicating	 with	
the	 people.	 For	 Müller	 (2015:	 86),	 a	 non-
populist	 leader	will	 say	 that	 he	works	with	
the	 system	 of	 democracy	 which	 lies	 on	 the	
concept	 of	 representation.	 As	 a	 working	
definition,	 this	 paper	 defines	 populism	 in	 a	
broad	manner	as	a	political	strategy	used	by	
leaders	 to	 reach	 their	 goals	 by	 identifying	
themselves	 as	 part	 of	 the	 people	 fighting	
against	 the	 elite.	 In	 terms	 of	 pragmatist	
leader,	 he	 tends	 to	 use	 populism	
rhetorichally,	 in	which	he	can	accommodate	






issues.	 First,	 this	 is	 a	 qualitative	 study	 and	
primarily	it	rests	on	discourse	analysis.	This	
study	 exploits	 secondary	 documents	 from	
journals	 and	 news	 articles	 that	 contain	
speeches	or	statements	made	by	Jokowi	and	
Prabowo	 during	 the	 latest	 presidential	
campaign	in	2019.	The	writers	then	analyzed	
those	documents	in	order	to	look	the	clarity	
of	 the	use	 of	 populism.	The	 study	describes	
the	 use	 of	 populism	 as	 a	 political	 strategy	








Indonesia’s	 path	 towards	 pragmatic	
populism	 can	 be	 traced	 back	 from	 the	
beginning	of	 its	 independence.	Although	 the	
use	of	populism	varies	from	time	to	time,	and	




large	 support	 in	 order	 to	 be	 in	 power.	 It	 is	
related	 to	 the	 fact	 that	 Indonesia	 is	 quite	
















most	 suitable	 political	 system	which	was	 in	
line	 with	 the	 country’s	 ideology	 and	
philosophy,	Pancasila.	Since	then,	Indonesian	
democracy	 has	 had	 its	 fair	 share	 of	 battles	
and	struggles	among	different	groups	where	
each	presidency	and	government	faced	their	
problems	 and	 challenges.	 Thus,	 Indonesian	
politics	became	a	contest	of	several	political	
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leader	 starts	 to	 use	 populist	 strategy	 to	
represents	“the	people”	as	a	whole.		
The	 first	 president	 of	 Indonesia	 and	
‘Proklamator’	 of	 independence,	 Soekarno,	
used	 populist	 strategy	 to	 unite	 Indonesian	
people.	 He	 used	 a	 populist	 doctrine	 of	
Marhaenism	to	represent	Indonesian	day-to-
day	struggle	of	predominantly	rural	working	
class	 (wongcilik)	 in	 the	 1950s	 and	 early	
1960s	 (Ziv,	 2001:	 75).	 The	 use	 of	 populist	
strategy	 somehow	 has	 become	 pragmatic	
since	Soekarno	himself	was	a	very	pragmatic	
leader.	 He	 did	 use	 symbolic	 representation	
when	it	best	suited	with	his	political	agenda,	
such	as	with	the	Islamic	symbol.	His	motive	is	
not	 a	 religious	 one,	 although	 he	 did	 use	
Islamic	symbols	prior	to	1945	when	he	used	
it	 to	 organize	 various	 grous	 to	 fight	 for	
independence.	 He	 even	 tried	 to	 create	
coalition	 of	 different	 segments:	 nasionalist,	
socialist	 and	 also	 communist.	 (Chalmers,	
2019).	 Soekarno	 is	 considered	as	 a	 resilient	
leader	 and	 a	 great	 orator,	 especially	 in	
exploiting	 the	 right	 moments.	 He	 believed	
that	he	can	unite	all	beliefs	in	Indonesia,	and	
in	 1950	 it	 was	 suggested	 that	 Soekarno	
should	have	a	party	of	his	own.	This	mainly	
because	of	he	believed	that	all	of	Indonesian	
people	 will	 support	 him	 regardless	 of	 the	
people’s	 religious	or	belief	backgrouds.	This	
including	 combining	 Muslim	 and	 Marxist,	
even	 though	Muslim	politicians	 is	 known	 to	
be	 very	 critical	 towards	 him	 (Wejak,	 2000:	
55-57).	 Soekarno’s	 populist	 appeals	 is	 used	
pragmatically,	as	he	used	populist	leadership	
as	 an	 effort	 to	 unite	 all	 Indonesian	 people,	
especially	 in	 the	 situation	 of	 domestic	
political	 struggle	 (Ramadhan	 and	
Simatupang,	2021;	Yilmaz,	2020).	
As	 the	 second	 president	 of	 Indonesia,	
Soeharto	 tried	 to	 suppress	 mass	 politics	 as	
well	as	populism	in	Indonesia	(Ziv,	2001:	75).	
He	 banned	 all	 activities	 related	 to	 the	 PKI,	
cleared	 the	 principles	 of	 communism,	 and	
controlled	 mass	 media.	He	 also	 welcomed	
foreign	 investment	 to	 support	 economic	
development	 in	 Indonesia	 (Suparno,	 2012:	
53;	 Erdianto,	 2016;	 Sammy,	 2018).	 The	
revival	 of	 populism	 in	 Indonesia	was	begun	
with	the	reformation	era,	especially	with	the	
rise	 of	 Soekarno’s	 daughter	 Megawati	
Soekarnoputri.	Megawati	was	known	for	her	
obsession	 on	 nationalism	 and	 national	
integrity.	 She	 also	 used	 her	 father	 populist	
doctrine	of	Marhaenism	 to	attract	people	 to	
support	 her	 as	 the	 next	 president	 of	
Indonesia	 in	 1999.	Megawati	was	 seen	 as	 a	
true	 representation	 of	 Indonesian	 people	
who	 have	 been	 the	 victims	 of	 Soeharto’s	
authoritarian	 regime	 (Ziv,	 2001:	75-76,	86).	
Although	 Megawati	 seemed	 to	 inherit	 her	
father’s	populist	image,	her	policy	during	the	
administration	was	 simply	 a	pragmatic	 one.	
Her	 leadership	 brought	 to	 light	 events	 that	
raised	 public	 concern	 and	 caused	
dissatisfaction	 such	 as	 the	 privatization	 of	
Badan	 Usaha	 Milik	 Negara/	 BUMN	 (State-
Owned	Enterprises).		
The	 use	 of	 populism	 in	 a	 more	
pragmatic	 manner,	 which	 is	 to	 support	





support	 his	 image	 among	 low-income	
segments	 of	 Indonesian	 society.	 One	
important	point	explained	by	Mietzner	is	that	
SBY	 cash	 payments	 was	 made	 close	 to	 the	
presidential	 election	 and	 it	 turned	 to	 boost	
his	positive	 image,	which	had	suffered	 from	
low	 popularity	 in	 opinion	 polls	 before	 the	
cash	 payments.	 Another	 example	 of	
pragmatist	 strategy	during	 the	 era	 SBY	was	
the	abolishment	of	rice	import,	in	which	it	is	






regarding	 populism	 is	 also	 related	 to	 its	
democratic	 experience.	 Indonesian	
democracy	 has	 long	 been	 surrounded	 by	
issues	 of	 rationality	 and	 pragmatism	 except	
for	 the	 Soeharto	 regime	 which	 was	 more	
authoritarian.	 Rationality	 and	 pragmatism	
here	 is	 when	 political	 parties	 and	 the	
Indonesian	 people	 gain	 the	 opportunity	 to	




the	 phenomenon	 of	 a	 catch-all	 party	 in	
Indonesia.	As	stated	by	Mayrudin	(2017:	164-
166),	 a	 catch-all	 party	 is	 a	 phenomenon	 in	
which	 political	 parties	 tend	 to	 accept	
pluralism,	 inclusivity,	 and	 accommodate	
various	 issues	 and	 agendas	 from	 various	
groups	 in	 the	 community.	 In	other	words,	 a	
catch-all	 party	 tries	 to	 position	 itself	 in	 the	
middle	of	different	groups,	camps,	or	ideology	
camps.	 Recent	 research	 conducted	 by	
Burhanuddin	 Muhtadi,	 Edward	 Aspinall,	
Diego	Fossati,	 and	Eve	Warburton,	 revealed	
that	 political	 parties	 in	 Indonesia	 tend	 to	
move	 in	 the	 middle	 of	 the	 spectrum	 of	 left	
ideology	 and	 right	 ideology.	 The	 research	
outlined	how	 religious	 issues	were	 the	only	
aspect	 where	 political	 parties	 in	 Indonesia	
obtain	 concrete	 and	 consistent	 differences.	
This	 research	 proved	 that	 ideology	 for	
political	parties	in	Indonesia	was	not	the	most	
decisive	 factor.	 Previous	 studies	 stated	 that	
political	 parties	 in	 Indonesia	 were	 open	





One	 of	 the	 main	 characteristics	 of	
populism	 is	 the	 use	 of	 anti-elite	 appeal	 to	
attract	 support	 from	 “the	 people.”	 Populist	
strategy	 tries	 to	 represent	 “the	 people”	 by	
blaming	the	corrupt	elite	that	harms	ordinary	
people.	Besides,	populism	usually	represents	
itself	 as	 homogenous	 people.	 As	 a	 result,	
populism	is	also	necessarily	anti-pluralist	and	
claims	 itself	 for	 100%	 of	 representation	 of	
“the	 people,”	 not	 only	 99%.	 Those	 unified	
people	who	are	led	by	populist	leader	always	
positioned	 themselves	 against	 small	
minorites,	especially	elites	(Müller,	2015:83	-	
85).	In	the	context	of	Indonesia,	it	all	started	
with	 the	 use	 of	 Indonesian	 day-to-day	
struggle	 of	 predominantly	 rural	 working	
class	 (wongcilik)	 by	 Soekarno	 that	
represented	 the	 people	 of	 Indonesia.	 The	
term	 wongcilik	 is	 still	 relevant	 in	 today’s	
context	as	it	is	still	used	by	many	Indonesian	
leaders	 to	 show	 their	 alignments	with	 poor	
and	 marginalized	 Indonesia.	 On	 the	 other	
hand,	“the	elite”	is	a	small	minority	who	does	
not	genuinely	work	or	take	benefit	 from	the	
system	 (Müller,	 2015:	 84).	 To	 be	 more	
precise,	 groups	 such	 as	 political	 elites	
(government,	political	parties),	media	(media	
tycoons,	journalist),	economic	(multinational	
corporations),	 or	 intellectual	 (scholars,	
teachers	 or	 well-educated	 background)	 are	
usually	being	targeted	as	part	of	the	elite	by	
populism	(Jagers	&	Walgrave,	2007:	324).	In	
Indonesia’s	 context,	 groups	 like	 business	
conglomerates,	 intellectuals,	 bureaucrats,	
and	political	parties	are	often	considered	as	
part	 of	 “the	 elite”.	 Those	 elites,	 especially	
from	 the	 government	 and	 political	 parties,	
are	 usually	 ranked	 high	 in	 terms	 of	
performance	 dissatisfaction	 among	
Indonesian	people.	As	 stated	by	Fossati	 and	
Meitzner,	 in	 terms	 of	 populism,	 Indonesian	
people	 are	more	 focus	on	politico-economic	
unfairness	 (Fossati	 &	Mietzner,	 2019:	 793).	




Pragmatic	 populism	 in	 Indonesia	
positions	the	leader	at	the	center	of	the	fault	
line	 between	 two	 polarizing	 groups	 created	
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by	 populism,	 “the	 people”	 and	 “the	 elite.”	
Although	 populism	 pushes	 the	 leader	 to	 be	
recognized	as	a	part	of	one	big	group	of	“the	
people,”	 pragmatism	 in	 Indonesia	 has	
encouraged	 political	 leaders	 to	 find,	 to	
maintain	 and	 to	 combine	 supports	 outside	
their	 affiliation,	 including	 those	 who	 are	
labeled	 as	 “the	 elite.”	 Populist	 leaders	 in	









In	 the	 context	 of	 modern-day	
Indonesian	 democracy,	 two	 leaders	 are	
considered	 as	 populists	 by	 many	 scholars,	
Jokowi	 and	 Prabowo,	 even	 though	 both	
leaders	 do	 not	 share	 the	 same	 type	 of	
populism.	 However,	 they	 actually	 use	
populism	pragmatically	as	a	political	strategy	
to	 reach	 their	 political	 goals.	 When	 we	
analyze	 the	 three	 indicators	 of	 a	 populist	





solely	 as	 the	 representative	 of	 “the	 people.”	
The	 term	 of	 people	 here	 is	 used	
pragmatically,	based	on	the	situation	faced	by	
the	 leader,	 as	 an	 indication	 of	 Indonesian	
people	which	also	consist	of	the	elite	as	well.	
This	 phenomenon	 is	 different	 compared	 to	
original	populism	which	is	characterized	with	




as	 a	 pragmatist	 approach	 by	 Jokowi	 and	
Prabowo.			
The	first	characteristic	of	the	analysis	is	
resentment	 which	 is	 evident	 in	 statements	
made	by	both	leaders.	As	explained	by	Müller	
(2015:	86),	 populist	 leader	 consistently	 and	
continuously	 denies	 the	 very	 legitimacy	 of	
their	 opponents.	 Meanwhile,	 a	 non-populist	
leader	 says	 that	 the	 policy	 is	 merely	
misguided.	 In	 the	words	of	Ufen	(2019:	28),	
populist	 leaders	 try	 to	 create	 clear	
antagonism	 between	 good	 and	 bad.	 Both	
Jokowi	 and	 Prabowo	 use	 their	 positions	 to	
criticize	 the	 elite.	 For	 Jokowi,	 he	 tried	 to	
criticize	 the	 previous	 government	 while	
Prabowo’s	 tactic	 was	 to	 chastise	 Jokowi’s	
administration.	 Prabowo	 frequently	
criticized	 and	 publicly	 lambasted	 the	
government.	 On	 one	 occasion,	 Prabowo	
stated	 that	 Jokowi’s	 government	 lacked	 of	
strength	which	he	claimed	was	the	byproduct	
of	 the	 country’s	 legal	 uncertainty	 and	
conflicts	 among	 governmental	 bodies	
(Rahadian,	 2018).	 	 He	 additionally	 claimed	
that	 the	 state	of	modern-day	 Indonesia	as	 a	
country	 was	 misaligned	 with	 the	 nation’s	
founding	 fathers’	 vision.	 Harnessing	 social	
media	 as	 a	 tool,	 Prabowo	 made	 numerous	
remarks	 on	 Facebook	 about	 Indonesia’s	
independence	 being	 threatened,	 how	 the	
government	 made	 violations	 during	 the	
election,	the	country’s	economy	and	military	
forces	 being	 weak,	 and	 how	 the	 nation’s	
trajectory	was	headed	in	the	wrong	direction	
(Kumparan,	2018).	On	his	Facebook	page,	he	
went	 so	 far	 as	 to	 claim	 that	 Indonesia’s	
former	 colonialists	 stole	 the	 country’s	
resources	 thereby	 creating	 problems	 for	
every	generation.	Prabowo	also	expressed	his	
discontent	 with	 Jakarta’s	 elite	 and	 how	 the	
public	had	been	 too	kind	 towards	 the	 elites	
although	 they	 were	 lazy	 and	 despicable	 by	






are	 lying”	 (Original	 statement	 in	 bahasa	




rakyat	 kita	 terlalu	 baik,	 elitenya	 tidak.	 Jadi	
malas	 bicara	 elite	 karena	 kebanyakan	
bohongnya”).	
To	 create	 a	 sense	 of	 antagonism	
between	good	and	bad,	Prabowo	went	further	
by	stipulating	that	the	government	operated	
recklessly	 (ugal-ugalan).	 The	 word	 of	 ugal-
ugalan	 is	 considered	as	 a	 strong	and	vulgar	
word	 in	 Indonesia	 (Rahadian,	 2018),	 and	 it	
means	 literally	 as	 indecent	 (rude)	behavior,	
impertinent,	 or	 naughty	 (Kamus	 Besar	
Bahasa	 Indonesia,	 2020).	 He	 said	 that	
reckless	 behavior	 was	 responsible	 for	 the	
recent	 situation	of	 Indonesia	 and	 it	was	 the	




bahasa	 Indonesia:	 “Perlahan-lahan	 mimpi	




Prabowo	 believed	 that	 Indonesia’s	 poverty	
line	had	gone	 from	bad	to	worse	(Pebrianto	
and	 Hanggi,	 2018).	 He	 used	 the	 word	
‘stupidity’	to	describe	the	current	situation	of	
Indonesian	 economy.	He	 further	 stated	 that	
Indonesia	 nowadays	 was	 implementing	 the	
era	 of	 ‘economic	 stupidity.’	 According	 to	
Prabowo,	 Indonesia’s	 economy	 was	 worse	
than	 the	 neo-liberal	 economic	 system	 of	
today	 (Erdianto,	2018).	He	said	 that,	 “in	my	
opinion,	 this	 is	 not	 a	 neoliberal	 economy	
anymore.	 This	 is	 worse	 than	 neolib.	 There	
must	be	a	term;	this	is,	in	my	opinion,	a	foolish	
economy.	The	economics	of	stupidity.	This	is	
what	 happened”	 (Original	 statement	 in	
bahasa	 Indonesia:	 “Ini	 menurut	 saya	 bukan	
ekonomi	 neoliberal	 lagi.	 Ini	 lebih	 parah	 dari	
neolib.	 Harus	 ada	 istilah,	 ini	 menurut	 saya	
ekonomi	 kebodohan.	 The	 economics	 of	
stupidity.	Ini	yang	terjadi”).	
On	the	other	hand,	Jokowi	also	criticized	
previous	governments	 though	 in	an	 indirect	
manner.	 In	 one	 of	 his	 speeches,	 Jokowi	
mentioned	social	justice	in	Indonesia	namely	
the	 single-price	 policy	 of	 gasoline	 in	
Indonesia.	Even	though	he	didn’t	mention	any	
specific	names	in	his	speech,	many	observers	
believed	 it	 was	 directed	 towards	 the	 SBY	
administration.	 While	 SBY	 responded	 to	
Jokowi’s	 speech,	 Jokowi	 didn’t	 provide	 any	
further	 comments	 (Ihsanuddin,	 2016).	
Furthermore,	he	also	addressed	the	injustice	
in	 Papua	 specifically	 referring	 to	 gasoline	
prices,	 therefore,	 his	 government	 tried	 to	
create	social	justice	by	implementing	a	single-
price	gasoline	policy	in	Indonesia	(Putsanra,	
2017).	 He	 stated	 that,	 “there	 is	 injustice	 in	
(the	price	of)	BBM,	in	Java,	 it	 is	only	around	
Rp7,000.	 Here	 (in	 Papua)	 up	 to	 Rp100,000	
per	liter.	In	Wamena,	Rp60,000	to	Rp70,000	
per	 liter”	 (Original	 statement	 in	 bahasa	
Indonesia:	 “(Harga)	 BBM	 ada	 ketidakadilan,	
di	Jawa	hanya	kisaran	Rp7.000	di	sini	(Papua)	
ada	 yang	 sampai	 Rp100	 ribu	 per	 liter,	 di	
Wamena	Rp60	ribu	hingga	70	ribu	per	liter”).	
The	 second	 characteristic	 is	 about	 the	
representation	of	the	people.	In	this	regard,	




Regarding	 this	 aspect	 of	 representation,	
Prabowo	 attempted	 to	 identify	 himself	 as	 a	




the	 Indonesian	 Farmers	 Association	 (HKTI)	
until	 2015	 (Kusumadewi,	 2015;	 Mietzner,	
2015).	According	 to	Mietzner,	Prabowo	also	
named	 his	 party	 with	 the	 name	 of	 Gerakan	
Indonesia	 Raya	 (Gerindra)	 or	 The	 Great	
Indonesia	 Movement	 to	 echo	 the	 sound	 of	
anti-party	sentiments.	In	doing	so,	he	aspired	
to	 restore	 Indonesia’s	 greatness.	
Nonetheless,	 Prabowo’s	 efforts	 to	 identify	
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himself	 as	 a	part	of	 the	people	were	mostly	
manufactured	 (Mietzner,	 2015:	 21-22).	
Prabowo	 also	 tried	 to	 grab	 the	 attention	 of	
rural	voters	and	the	lower	class	as	part	of	his	
populist	 strategy,	 especially	 since	 he	
recognized	the	need	to	ease	his	image	as	part	





is	 to	 defend	 all	 groups	 and	 communities	 so	
that	our	children	and	grandchildren	prosper”	
(Original	 statement	 in	 bahasa	 Indonesia:	
“Terimakasih,	 Pak.	 Terima	 kasih	 atas	
dukungan	 Bapak,	 perjuangan	 saya	 adalah	
untuk	 membela	 seluruh	 kelompok	 dan	





dialogues	 with	 various	 Indonesian	
communities	 demonstrated	 his	 approach	 of	
populist	style	of	representation.	Among	those	
he	 held	 discussions	 with	 were	 young	
Indonesian	 conglomerates	 (Ihsanuddin,	
2018),	artists	and	comedians	(Jordan,	2015),	
representatives	 of	 small	 and	 medium	
enterprises	(Siswanto	&	Tanjung,	2016),	and	
religious	 figures	 (Jordan,	2017).	 Jokowi	also	
tried	 to	 engage	with	 Indonesians	who	were	
considered	 to	 be	 neglected	 by	 previous	
administrations.	 This	 included	 as	 the	 first	
Indonesian	President	who	visited	 the	Papua	
region	 (Tempo.co,	 2017)	 whereas	 of	 April	
2018,	he	made	eight	official	visits	to	the	area	
(Sutriyanto,	 2018).	 The	 move	 had	 been	
viewed	 as	 groundbreaking	 given	 that	 the	
general	 opinion	 in	 Indonesia	 was	 of	 a	
government	that	solely	focuses	on	Java	Island	
(Javasentris).	 In	 addition,	 Jokowi	had	 stated	
his	 intention	 to	 initiate	 social	 justice	 for	 all	




using	 traditional	 outfits	 and	 costumes	 on	
many	occasions.	This	act	had	been	repeated	
by	 his	 first	 Vice	 President,	 Jusuf	 Kalla,	 and	
other	ministers	which	carry	on	today.	On	one	
occasion,	 Jokowi	wore	a	traditional	costume	
from	 Bugis,	 while	 Jusuf	 Kalla	 wore	 a	
traditional	 costume	 from	 Java.	 This	 gesture	
symbolizes	 Jokowi’s	 efforts	 in	 trying	 to	
represent	 Indonesia’s	 diversity	 from	 every	
culture,	group,	and	community	(Adam,	2017).	
The	 final	 characteristic	 is	 the	
relationship	 between	 the	 leader	 and	 their	
constituents	or	the	people.	A	sign	of	populist	
approach	 by	 Jokowi	 could	 be	 seen	 from	his	
hobby	 of	 blusukan,	 an	 impromptu	 visit	 to	
public	 places	 such	 as	 markets	 where	 he	 is	
able	 to	 listen	 to	 public	 concerns	 (Mietzner,	
2015:	26).	 Since	his	 role	as	 the	Governor	of	
Jakarta,	 Jokowi	 had	 become	 synonymous	
with	 carrying	 out	 blusukan	 where	 he	
maintains	 this	 initiative	 as	 the	 President	 of	
Indonesia.	He	has	gone	so	far	as	to	promote	
his	trademark	blusukan	act	to	global	leaders	
(Sipahutar,	 2016).	 Jokowi’s	 opponent,	
Prabowo,	 made	 a	 similar	 effort	 to	 Jokowi’s	
signature	act.	It	is	even	claimed	that	Prabowo	
had	 already	 been	 managed	 a	 kind	 of	
impromptu	 visit	 since	 he	 was	 the	 leader	 of	
Indonesian	 Traditional	 Market	 Traders	
Association	(Asosiasi	Pedagang	Pasar	Seluruh	
Indonesia)	(Liputan	6,	2014).	
Nevertheless,	 all	 the	 above	
characteristics	of	populist	strategy	have	been	
used	pragmatically.	The	antagonism	between	
elite	 and	 the	 people	 is	 not	 polarizing	 as	 it	
should	 be	 brought	 by	 populist	 leader.	 In	
Indonesia,	both	Jokowi	and	Prabowo	used	the	
anti-elite	 strategy	 inconsistently,	 making	 it	
pragmatic	as	it	was	used	only	to	attract	larger	
support	 from	 the	people.	As	 stated	by	Ufen,	
leader	who	condemns	and	attacks	the	corrupt	
elite	 does	 not	 automatically	 become	 a	
populist.	 In	 this	 regard,	 we	 call	 him	 as	 a	
pragmatist	 populist,	 since	 the	 leader	 uses	
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populist	 strategy	 (anti-elite)	 to	attract	more	
support	 in	 order	 to	 respect	 the	 political	
constraints	and	to	work	with	the	system.	For	
Hermann	 (2001:	 97),	 the	 indication	 of	
pragmatist	 leader	 is	 “if	 the	 time	 is	 right	 to	
push	their	own	positions,	they	can	do	so;	but	
such	 leaders	 can	 also	 accommodate	 to	
pressure	 if	 the	 time	 is	 quite	 right.”	 In	
Indonesia,	both	Jokowi	and	Prabowo	tend	to	





the	 time.	 On	 one	 occasion,	 Prabowo	
acknowledged	 Jokowi’s	 administration	 of	
running	 the	 country	 and	 also	 some	
achievements	 being	 made	 (Ibrahim,	 2019).	
He	stated	that,	“my	friends,	we	see	good	faith	
(government	 development)	 and,	 however,	
Mr.	Jokowi	has	the	results	already	achieved”	
(Original	 statement	 in	 bahasa	 Indonesia:	
“Sahabat-sahabatku,	 kita	melihat	 itikad	 baik	
(pembangunan	 pemerintah)	 dan	
bagaimanapun	 Pak	 Jokowi	 punya	 hasil-hasil	
yang	 dicapai”).	 Moreover,	 during	 the	
registration	 of	 the	 Presidential	 candidacy	
event,	 Prabowo	 arrived	 at	 the	 Komisi	
Pemilihan	 Umum/	 KPU	 (General	 Election	
Commission)	with	his	car,		accompanied	by	a	
marching	 band,	 and	 conducted	 a	 traditional	
military	 ritual	 by	 greeting	 his	 supporters	
from	 his	 open	 Jeep	 vehicle.	 This	 illustrated	
Prabowo’s	signaling	his	character	that	he	was	
a	 General	 and	 had	 a	 military	 background	
(Wiwoho,	 2018).	 Thus,	 while	 Prabowo	
originally	 portrayed	 himself	 as	 the	 voice	 of	
Indonesian	 farmers,	 his	 public	 event	
displaying	 his	 military	 background	 was	
considered	contradictory	given	that	the	army	
was	once	part	of	the	country’s	elite	group.	It	
is	 true	 that,	 as	 stated	 by	Ufen	 (2019:	 29),	 a	
populist	 leader	 can	 also	 come	 from	 an	 elite	
background.	However,	 it	would	be	too	naïve	
to	neglect	the	fact	that	Prabowo	comes	from	a	
group	 that	 still	 considered	 as	 an	 elite	 in	
Indonesian	 history:	 the	 Soeharto’s	 group	 of	
people.	The	fact	that	Prabowo	was	looking	for	
supports	 from	 elite	 can	 be	 seen	 as	 an	
indication	 that	he	used	populist	merely	as	a	
mean	 to	 gather	 larger	 support.	 It	 was	
reported	that	Prabowo	even	visited	Cendana	
to	 find	 support	 from	 his	 ex-wife	 Titiek	
Soeharto	(Kurniawan,	2018).	Titiek	then	said	
that	 her	 family	 (through	 her	 new	 political	
party)	 would	 support	 Prabowo	 in	 the	 next	
presidential	 election,	 “We	 are	 ready	 to	
welcome	 this	 support	 for	 Pak	 Prabowo	
Subianto	 and	 Pak	 Sandiaga	 Uno”	 (Original	
statement	 in	 bahasa	 Indonesia:	 “Kami	
bersedia	 menyambut	 dukungan	 itu	 untuk	
pasangan	 Pak	 Prabowo	 Subianto	 dan	 Pak	
Sandiaga	Uno”).	
Besides,	Prabowo’s	popularity	was	well	
accepted	 in	 the	 middle-class	 people	 of	
Indonesia.	The	fact	that	Prabowo	condemned	
and	attacked	the	government	quite	often	was	
seen	 as	 merely	 a	 strategy	 to	 gather	 more	
support	from	grassroots	level	since	Jokowi’s	
base	 of	 support	was	 rural	 and	 poor	 people.	
Although	Prabowo	had	tried	to	mobilize	the	
lower	 class	 and	 rural	 voters,	 he	 was	
predominantly	 supported	by	a	middle	 class,	
educated	 and	 urban	 electorate	 (Mietzner,	
2015:	 44).	 Various	 surveys	 conducted	 by	
LingkaranSurvei	 Indonesia	 (LSI),	
KonsepIndo,	 LitbangKompas,	 CSIS	 and	
IndikatorPolitik	 Indonesia	 revealed	 that	
Prabowo	 was	 popular	 among	 elite,	 such	 as	
urban	 elite	 and	 well-educated	 people	
(Nathaniel,	2019).	To	compete	with	Jokowi’s	
rural-based	support	and	to	win	support	at	the	
grassroots	 level,	 Prabowo	 chose	 Sandiaga	
Uno	who	was	more	 attractive	 to	 the	people	
(CNN	Indonesia,	2018a).		
The	 same	phenomenon	 also	 happened	
to	 Jokowi.	 Jokowi	 came	 from	 the	nationalist	
party,	 PDI-P.	 This	 alone	 created	 political	
constraint	 that	 Jokowi	 represented	
nationalist	 groups	 rather	 than	 religious	
groups.	 He,	 however,	 tried	 to	 combine	
nationalism	 and	 Islam	 as	 a	 means	 of	
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underlining	 Indonesia’s	 diversity	 (Bayuni,	
2017).	 After	 registering	 his	 Presidential	
candidacy,	he	chose	Ma’ruf	Amin	as	his	Vice	
President	in	the	2019	Presidential	Campaign.	
Ma’ruf	 Amin	 was	 the	 Chairman	 of	 the	
Indonesia	 Ulema	 Council	 (MUI)	 and	 was	
considered	as	a	representative	of	the	Muslim	
community	 (ABC	 Net,	 2018).	 This	 decision	
highlighted	Jokowi’s	bid	to	catch-all	people	or	




business	 people,	 for	 example	 from	 Erick	
Tohir,	 Hari	 Tanoesoedibjo,	 Surya	 Paloh	 and	
OesmanSaptaOdang	 (Nathaniel,	 2019).	 In	
terms	 of	 resentment,	 one	 of	 the	 differences	
between	Jokowi	and	Prabowo	was	the	direct	
condemnation	 towards	 the	 elite.	 Jokowi	
rarely	criticized	the	elite	in	front	of	the	public,	
but	 often	 spoke	 about	 social	 justice	 in	
Indonesia	 without	 referencing	 any	 specific	
actors.	He	strove	for	a	compromise	between	
the	 people	 and	 the	 elite	 by	 using	 non-
confrontational	language.	In	his	state-of-the-
nation-address	 before	members	 of	 the	MPR	
on	 16	 August	 2017,	 Jokowi	 said	 (Putsanra,	
2017),	“I	am	sure	that	only	with	an	equitable	
economic	 equality,	 we	 will	 be	 more	 united.	
Equitable	development	will	unite	 Indonesia.	
Equitable	development	will	make	us	stronger	
to	 face	 global	 competition”	 (Original	
statement	 in	 bahasa	 Indonesia:	 “Saya	 yakin	
hanya	 dengan	 pemerataan	 ekonomi	 yang	
berkeadilan,	 kita	 akan	 semakin	 bersatu.	





institutions	 had	 to	 work	 for	 the	 people.	 He	
further	 said	 that	 only	 with	 cooperation	
between	 state’s	 institutions	 the	 justice	 for	
Indonesian	 people	 would	 be	 achieved	
(Dewan	 Perwakilan	 Rakyat	 Republik	
Indonesia,	 2017).	 This	 showed	 his	
pragmatism	 over	 populism	 in	 which	 he	
combined	 both	 populist	 method	 of	
impromptu	 visit	 while	 at	 the	 same	 time	
encouraged	the	use	of	intermediaries	as	part	
of	 a	 good	 democracy.	 He	 also	 supported	 a	





Populism	 becomes	 a	 buzz	 word	 in	
today’s	 political	 debate.	 The	 phenomenon	
happens	in	many	parts	of	the	world	as	a	sign	
of	 dissatisfaction	 towards	 the	 corrupt	 elite.	
One	 of	 the	 important	 characteristics	 of	
populism	 is	 resentment	 towards	 the	 elite	
which	 creates	 antagonism	 between	 “the	
people”	 and	 “the	 elite.”	 This	 kind	 of	
phenomenon	 is	 also	 believed	 to	 occur	 in	
Indonesia,	especially	in	the	context	of	Jokowi	
and	 Prabowo	 in	 the	 last	 Indonesia’s	
presidential	 election.	 According	 to	 many	
scholars	 like	 Mietzner,	 Aspinall	 and	 Hadiz,	




that	 Indonesian	 leaders	 have	 a	 tendency	 to	
use	 populism	 merely	 as	 a	 strategy	 of	
leadership	in	order	to	find	larger	supports.	It	
is	 not	 intended	 as	 a	 true	 populist	 style	
strategy	 in	 which	 it	 focuses	 on	 anti-elite	
discourse.	 Populism	 is	 merely	 used	 as	 a	
means	to	an	end	by	both	Jokowi	and	Prabowo.			
Many	Indonesia’s	 leaders	have	tried	to	
use	 populism	 as	 a	 strategy	 to	 attract	
supporters.	 It	 might	 be	 used	 at	 first	 by	
Indonesia’s	 proclamator	 Soekarno	 when	 he	
claimed	supports	from	many	poor	Indonesian	
and	 marginalized	 or	wongcilik.	 The	 idea	 of	
wongcilik	 is	 still	 relevant	 in	 today’s	
Indonesian	politics.	The	use	of	populist	 idea	
as	 a	 strategy	 could	 be	 observed	 from	









it	 to	 attract	 more	 supports	 for	 their	
presidential	campaigns.	In	this	regard,	it	is	a	
strategy	 of	 leadership	 that	 tries	 to	 find,	 to	
maintain	 and	 to	 combine	 more	 supports,	
including	those	who	are	labeled	as	“the	elite.”	
Therefore,	 the	 idea	of	populism	that	usually	
creates	 polarization	 between	 “the	 people”	
and	 “the	 elite”	 in	 Indonesia	 has	 derived	 a	
different	 antagonism.	 Indonesian	 leaders	




for	 support	 from	 Soeharto’s	 circle	 that	 is	
considered	 as	 the	 true	 elite	 opposed	 by	 the	
people	 of	 Indonesia.	 On	 another	 occasion,	
Prabowo	 even	 praised	 the	 achievement	 of	
Jokowi’s	 administration.	 In	 similar	 way,	
Jokowi	 also	 did	 almost	 the	 same	 thing.	 He	
tried	 to	 criticize	 previous	 government	 for	
misguided	 policy	 in	 non-confrontational	
manner,	 did	 impromptu	 visit,	 but	 also	
acknowledged	the	achievement	of	Indonesian	
democracy	 and	 worked	 with	 successful	
Indonesian	 businessmen.	 This	 paper	 offers	
the	 observation	 on	 what	 happened	 with	
populism	in	Indonesia,	and	it	suggests	that	all	
characteristics	of	populist	strategy	have	been	
used	 pragmatically	 by	 Indonesian	 leaders,	
both	 Jokowi	and	Prabowo,	 in	order	 to	work	
with	political	 constraints.	This	phenomenon	
might	 have	 appeared	 as	 a	 consequence	 of	
Indonesia’s	democracy	which	always	related	
to	 the	 issue	 of	 pragmatism	 and	 populism	
itself	 somehow	 cannot	 be	 the	 sole	 way	 to	
attract	support.	The	fact	that	Indonesia	has	a	
specific	 journey	 towards	 independence	 and	
democracy	 could	 become	 a	 lesson	 learned.	
Thus,	diverse	background	of	 cultures,	 races,	
groups,	 communities,	 and	 even	 ideologies	
might	 be	 resulted	 in	 the	 utilization	 of	
populism	pragmatically,	 especially	 to	gather	
more	support	and	have	communication	with	
wider	 audience.	 However,	 further	 research	
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